Vladimir Kazimirov

Looking for a Way Out of the Karabakh Impasse

Vladimir Kazimirov is an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation; from 1992 to 1996 the head of Russia’s intermediary mission, plenipotentiary representative of the Russian president for Nagorno-Karabakh, participant and Russia’s co-chairman of the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The parties must restore a normal negotiating process. The best way for this to begin is to initiate intensive talks at the level of plenipotentiary delegations on four points simultaneously: 1) the consolidation of the armistice regime; 2) a temporary status for Nagorno-Karabakh and elements of its final status; 3) the liberation of the occupied territories and the return of displaced persons home; and 4) other points that will lead to the normalization of mutual relations. Negotiations which are structured around compromise would let the parties discuss all the problems involved in the settlement, alternating the aforementioned four issues and removing the present situation when the parties try – persistently but vainly – to impose their own priorities on each other. Instead of the endless debate about the hierarchy of principles, there will emerge a possibility for pragmatic ’deals,’ for combining the parties’ interests and looking for possible ’swap solutions,’ even though these may be dissymmetrical. Even if the first signs of progress are made in negotiating minor issues, this would still be important for it would be a first step out of the impasse.

A compromise can also be reached on the format of the negotiations: general issues can be discussed by the three major parties, while more specific issues can be discussed by Azerbaijan and Armenia, or by Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh (the third party should attend the negotiations only as an observer, without the right to express its own view). Furthermore, there will emerge a valuable opportunity for ’talking in the corridors.’

Naturally, the proposed negotiating scheme is not a panacea for all problems. It would only serve to show the way out of the long deadlock and open up prospects for gradually reducing tensions and improving the situation in the conflict region. Considering that no headway has been made in relations between the conflicting parties over the last decade of the armistice, the opportunities that such a negotiating plan can provide must not be missed.

It is important to note in closing that this plan would not damage the legitimate rights and interests of any of the conflicting parties.

the breakup of the Soviet Union, after which the conflict ceased to be internal, that is, in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, and became an international conflict between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia. This is the only conflict that has directly involved two former Soviet republics, now sovereign countries and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

This factor helps to explain the cause of the argument over who should conduct the negotiations and with whom; this dispute has been continuing for over ten years. Before 1994, the Republic of Armenia pretended that it was not a party to ‘the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.’ Indeed, Baku and Stepanakert reached mutual agreements on ten separate occasions without Yerevan, and only twice with its participation. In late 1993, Azerbaijan started a game of its own, refusing to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to the conflict and denying it the right to participate in negotiations. Unfortunately, these practices continue to this day. For these purely subjective reasons, the negotiating process has been deformed; meaningful and regular negotiations have not been conducted since 1997. Rather, they have been replaced by shuttle trips of go-betweens, and the occasional meetings between the two countries’ presidents and foreign ministers.

The parties have been deliberately delaying the settlement of the conflict: the Armenians hope that everyone will get accustomed to the status quo, while Azerbaijan pins its hopes on an oil boom and the reinforcement of its army. Each party believes that time is on its side, but in actual fact the hardships are great for both. The excessive emphasis laid on propagandist arguments and disputes over procedural issues prevents the discussion of the conflict’s essential problems. Another obstacle standing in the way of a peace settlement is the information war waged by all of the parties involved: they distort the way things really stand, seek to defame the other side and stoke distrust and mutual enmity; this is going to have a baneful effect on the younger generation. The abundant newspaper reports covering the settlement process are a distorting mirror of the reality, as everything there tends to be distorted by propaganda and false arguments. The parties often display a lack of information or, conversely, cynically exploit the lack of information among the population.

Nor does the political situation in the two countries help the prospects for a peace settlement. The respective leaders have little room for maneuver and concessions, and domestic politics often cause them to toughen their positions at the bilateral negotiations. For example, the persistence with which Armenian leader Robert Kocharyan demands a ’package settlement’ is largely explained by the fate of his predecessor, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who did not rule out a stage-by-stage settlement of the Karabakh conflict – his position did not meet with public support and he had to resign from his post. Similarly, Azerbaijani leader Heidar Aliyev in 2001 was about to surrender Nagorno-Karabakh for a token payment in order to relieve his successor of the unsettled burden of conflict. However, even his administration did not support the idea, and he was eventually forced to give it up. Besides, Aliyev (and later his successor, his son Ilham Aliyev) strongly opposed the participation of Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiation process. One of the reasons was that Aliyev’s main political rival, ex-speaker of parliament Rasul Guliyev, recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to the conflict.

Initially, efforts to achieve a political settlement of the conflict involved the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as Iran and Kazakhstan, which all acted as intermediaries. Yet the decisive contribution to the settlement was made by Russia. This was proven by the CSCE Budapest summit in December 1994 where the CSCE was reorganized into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Russia achieved a ceasefire and launched the negotiating process. Following the Budapest summit, Russia became a co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group. [This group was formed de facto in June 1992 after Azerbaijan refused to take part in the CSCE Minsk conference on Nagorno-Karabakh until Armenians pulled out their troops from the towns of Shusha and Lachin which they had invaded in May 1992. The Minsk Group then comprised representatives of 11 countries that were to take part in the conference: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey and the United States. Later, the group’s composition was slightly altered. – Ed.]

Following the Budapest summit, the co-chairmanship institution became the main settlement mechanism, while the Minsk Group was used as a platform for political consultations. The Western powers, however, feared Russia’s growing influence in Transcaucasia and repeatedly foiled its intermediary efforts, often through the Minsk Group.

Beginning in 1997, international intermediaries made up of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group (Russia, the U.S. and France) proposed three different variants for a peace settlement: a package agreement, a stage-by-stage settlement, and the establishment of a ’common state.’ However, the parties rejected all of them. Then the intermediaries proposed that Azerbaijan and Armenia work between themselves to solve their problems with the help of intermediaries. Now, following two dozen summit meetings and an 18-month interval caused by a series of elections in the two countries, as well as the illness and death of Heidar Aliyev, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia (Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan) and their foreign ministers (Elmar Mamedyarov and Vardan Oskanyan) are entering into dialog.

This dialog can only be welcomed, of course, yet its potentialities are obviously limited since the positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan are even more divergent than before. They still have a very long way to go before full-scale negotiations begin; thus far, the two parties have only held consultations in order to forward their positions and find, at least, some common ground. In order to realistically approach a peace agreement Stepanakert must join the negotiations; it continues to remain on the sidelines. The confidentiality of the meetings and the stepped-up efforts of some international organizations (the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly) on the Karabakh issue are only providing fertile soil for new speculations and illusions.

Of the many problems that provoked the conflict and were caused by the conflict itself, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh has been the most pressing, despite the fact that Baku has been trying hard – and not without success – to divert international attention to “the occupation of Azerbaijani territory,” one of the conflict’s consequences. Baku upholds the principle of territorial integrity, while Yerevan advocates nations’ right to self-determination. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh call for a comprehensive ‘package’ solution to the outstanding problems, which would provide for Nagorno-Karabakh joining Armenia or acquiring independence. Only on such terms are the Armenians ready to withdraw their troops from seven Azerbaijani districts outside Nagorno-Karabakh, which they describe as a ‘security zone.’ The occupation is used as a trump card (‘status in exchange for territories’). Baku insists on a stage-by-stage solution, with the liberation of the occupied territories as the first step. At the same time, Azerbaijan gives only vague promises to grant Nagorno-Karabakh “the broadest autonomy possible” and prefers to postpone the solution of the status problem for an indefinite period of time. The incompatibility of the parties’ demands is obvious. The disputes about what must be done first (removing the causes of the conflict or its consequences) is like arguing about which came first – the chicken or the egg.

Obviously, the present leader of Azerbaijan is unable to follow up on the negotiations held by Robert Kocharyan and Heidar Aliyev in Paris and Key West in 2001 since those negotiations focused on a package agreement. Such an agreement would be an ideal solution, but in the foreseeable future it will hardly be attainable: it would be tantamount to political suicide for the Baku leaders if Nagorno-Karabakh ends up independent of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Similarly, the leaders of Yerevan and Stepanakert run the risk of losing their power if Nagorno-Karabakh remains part of Azerbaijan.

Global developments over the last few years show that the future of Nagorno-Karabakh would best be decided not at the negotiating table, but through a free expression of the population’s will. Stepanakert insists that such a referendum was already held in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991, while Baku argues that ethnic Azerbaijanis did not take part in it. A new referendum would be very difficult to hold, although its outcome is quite predictable since there are no more Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh. (Similarly, there are no more Armenians in Baku, Gyandzh, Shaumyanovsk and Nakhichevan.) The two peoples, which formerly blended with each other, are now split. A voluntary return of the refugees to their respective homes is a wonderful idea, but it would be difficult to implement even on the territories subject to liberation.

Although officially the Armenians do not have claims to lands outside Nagorno-Karabakh (except for the Lachin corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia), they often refer to them as “liberated;” they have even set up a movement that is named “For the Defense of the Liberated Territories.” As a result, they have done a disservice to Armenian diplomacy and played into the hands of Baku’s propaganda of anti-Armenianism. Few people would take such a claim seriously; it is also of doubtful value as a tactical bargaining chip at the negotiations.

Baku goes too far, as well, equating occupation with aggression or posing itself only as a victim of the conflict. No doubt, occupation is a malignant tumor of war, and one of the products of its cruel logic. But why does Baku hush up the circumstances that brought about the situation? It is not only the Armenians, but the leaders of Azerbaijan, as well, who are to blame for the occupation. It was Baku that chose to use force to settle the conflict. In the early 1990s, it more than once missed the chance for a political settlement and repeatedly violated the cease-fire agreement that was achieved with Russia’s assistance. Its actions ran counter to four resolutions of the United Nations Security Council adopted in 1993.

Meanwhile, these resolutions cannot be considered outside the context of the hostilities in Karabakh. Of the many demands set forth in the documents, the main one was a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities and military actions. Resolution 853, adopted after the Armenians seized the district of Agdam, demanded “the immediate cessation of all hostilities and the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces.” However, Resolutions 874 and 884 no longer contained the words “complete and unconditional” before “withdrawal.” By thwarting the cease-fire arrangements (see Resolution 884), Azerbaijan itself has turned the ‘liberation of territories’ from an unconditional demand into a subject for negotiations.

The new leaders of Azerbaijan have taken an even tougher position on Nagorno-Karabakh, ruling out any concessions and compromise. Baku has abandoned itself to the chimera of military revenge. Its threats to settle the conflict ‘at any cost’ – that is, by force – largely meet the requirements of Azerbaijan’s domestic politics and run counter to its international commitments. Nevertheless, this factor does not make the threats less harmful, nor does it spare the outside world from necessarily reacting to them. Paradoxically, Baku’s policy plays into the hands of the Armenians as it gives them one more argument against their pullout from the fortified line of contact with the adversary.

Unfortunately, the spirit of a policy of force still prevails in the conflict zone over the spirit of law. No progress will be achieved in settling the Karabakh conflict unless the warring parties give up their unfeasible goals. In order to enter into new, more effective negotiations, the parties must, to their mutual advantage, discard their fixed ideas: the Armenians must drop their demand for a ’package settlement,’ while the Azerbaijanis must stop issuing threats of military revenge. Both parties must officially renounce the use of force in settling the conflict. This change in policy will not be a loss for the parties, but will deliver them from vain illusions.

As the warring sides fight for their ’national interests,’ the respective leaders ignore the common interests of the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples, deny them the advantages of natural and friendly relations with their neighbors, and doom them to a life of tension and stagnation. Since mutual mistrust is the main psychological obstacle, it is time the leaders of the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis proclaim (better jointly) a policy toward an historic reconciliation. The proclamation of this lofty goal will give their leaders the ability to negotiate balanced concessions with each other – something which their societies are not ready to accept at the moment. Concessions are inevitable, and even the most painful of them will be repaid through lasting peace, economic revival and growth for the entire region. There is much sense in the statement that ’compromise is above victory.’

It is important to note in closing that this plan would not damage the legitimate rights and interests of any of the conflicting parties.