Paper by Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov

Head of the Mediation Mission of Russia, 1992-96, Plenipotentiary of the President of the Russian Federation on Nagorno Karabakh, Participant and Co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group

ALTERNATIVES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE KARABAKH CONFLICT

The old, chronic dispute between Armenians and Azerbaijanis on the future of Nagorno Karabakh (NK) led to the first armed conflict in the USSR. Ethnic-based, the conflict was large in scale and heavy in consequences. The collapse of the USSR removed the last framework restraining antagonisms. The interstate conflict became even fiercer as it soon was transformed into a tripartite confrontation, involving the Azerbaijani Republic, the unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Republic of Armenia. The military operations of 1991-94 ended with the establishment of almost complete Armenian control on NK and the occupation of seven other areas of Azerbaijan around it. On May 12, 1994 it was a piece of luck that the mass bloodshed was stopped, but what followed was a situation of "neither war, nor peace." The ten-year armistice is the only appreciable achievement for both peoples. All other efforts to resolve controversial problems by political means have yet to produce any results.

The conflict touched directly on the interests of neighboring countries (Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Iran); it also gained the attention of western powers, basically because of geostrategic considerations and of these powers’ interest in the energy potential of the Caspian Sea. Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkey, and mainly the OSCE among the international organizations tried to mediate. The competition between them gave the parties of the conflict room to maneuver. Azerbaijan blocked the convocation of the OSCE Minsk Conference on NK; instead, there was an erzats structure, the Minsk Group (MG). The western powers considered MG not only as the mechanism of resolution but also as a challenge to Russia's position as a mediator and a means to diminish Russian influence in Transcaucasia.

The OSCE Summit in Budapest on December 6, 1994 was compelled to recognize Russia's "decisive contribution" in arranging the cease-fire and established a negotiating process that gave Russia a co-chairman of the MG. The co-chairmanship became the basic negotiation mechanism and the MG a format for infrequent consultations.

During negotiations from 1994 to 1997, agreement was reached over 80% of the conditions to bring an end to the conflict. But the new co-chairmen of OSCE MG, now made up of Russia, the US and France, were unable to overcome the obstinacy of the parties and worked with them using formulas other than what was offered in Budapest. During 1997-98 the co-chairmen offered the parties three different proposals as a basis for negotiations known as "the package deal," the "step-by-step" formula, and "the common state" formula. But the parties - now one, then another or a third - rejected the proposals. Not abandoning their efforts, the mediators then offered the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia help in continuing the search for basis of agreement through bilateral discussions.

After 20 meetings between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, there was a hiatus of 18 months due to because of a series of elections in both countries and the passing of President Geydar Aliev. Currently we have the beginning of a dialogue between Robert Kocharian and Ilham Aliyev, supported by talks between the ministers of foreign affairs, Armenia’s Vartan Oskanian and Azerbaijan’s Eldar Mamedyarov. Yet the positions of the parties are even more divergent than they were during Geydar Aliev’s rule. The short duration and episodic meetings of the presidents and ministers do not reflect the significance that the resolution of the Karabakh conflict has for the parties. These talks constitute mere consultations on the specifics of positions and a search for a common basis for negotiations. But there are no full-scale negotiations. Furthermore, NK is not a participant in these talks. It is clear that it is impossible to impose on NK a solution to which NK has not agreed. Moreover, the confidentiality of the meetings only inflames passions and create illusions. Finally, the occasional activation of other structures (the European Community, the European Council, PACE) also confuses the situation.

On the level of principles, Baku relies on the sanctity of the territorial integrity of states, while Armenians assert the right of nations to self-determination. The most important among the problems that engendered the conflict - and those that have been generated by it - is the status of NK. The status of NK was a principal cause of the conflict, although Baku, not unsuccessfully, tries to switch attention from the status of NK to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories, one of the grave consequences of conflict. Yerevan and Stepanakert favor a comprehensive solution that resolves all outstanding issues (the "package deal"); they insist that under no circumstances NK can be a part of Azerbaijan, that is, NK will either be independent or be united with Armenia. Baku tries to achieve the "step-by-step" solution by asserting that first must come the liberation of the territories must be obtained in a first stage along with a general promise to grant NK "the widest autonomy," while postponing the problem of the status for a later stage. The incompatibility of the positions of the parties is obvious, and the dispute over what to remove first - the cause or consequences - is similar to the dispute over the chicken and egg.

Experience shows that the most natural way of solving the NK conflict is through the will of the people. But Stepanakert insists that a referendum has already been conducted in NK in 1991 while Baku argues that the NK Azerbaijanis did not participate in that referendum. To conduct a new plebiscite is extremely difficult, though its outcome is quite predictable: the Azerbaijani people made up a quarter of NK’s population, and now they are not present on the territory at all. (There are also no Armenians currently residing in Baku, Gandja, Shaumyan, and Nakhichevan).

The conflict has led to the complete separation of two nations that "lived together" before. The principle of the voluntary return of the refugees and displaced people to their native lands is fine but not easy to implement, even in the territories around NK populated by Azerbaijanis before the conflict currently under Armenian control. The issue becomes even more complicated when referring to Azerbaijanis of NK, and Armenians of Baku, Shaumyan, and others. It is time to ask therefore, to what extent is this principle realizable now, and what is the best way of implementing it under existing circumstances?

Officially, Armenians do not present claims on the occupied districts outside NK (except for the Lachin corridor to serve as a land communication with Armenia), yet more and more often call them "liberated" territories. They have even established a movement for the "Defense of Liberated Territories." To consider seriously the "application" of such an approach is practically impossible, it is а doubtful proposition. It is obvious that such excesses actually contribute to Armenophobia.

Baku, even the official one, does not concede to the Armenian side in its excesses. Here Azerbaijan is presented only as a victim of the conflict, and occupation of land is identified with aggression. Undoubtedly, occupation is a malignant tumor of war, one of the products of its cruel logic. But the authorities of Azerbaijan are also guilty: They staked their fortunes on the use of force to resolve the conflict; more than once during the 1992-1994 war they missed the opportunity for a political settlement; they violated, more often than Armenians, cease-fires established with Russian assistance. They too failed to implement the main requirement of the four UN Security Council resolutions (1993) - the cessation of military operations - documents mentioned often nowadays in Baku in support of their own case.

To be on the safe side, the new leadership of Azerbaijan has adopted a more hard line position on NK than did Geydar Aliev; it speaks against any concessions or compromises. For some time now Baku is full with the bellicose rhetoric; it has involuntarily fallen prey to chimeras of a military revenge.

Unfortunately, to date the dominant belief in the conflict zone is that force is superior to what is right. The situation is governed by two idées fixes: one party threatens revenge, the other tries to impose a "package deal," which is nothing but a will to dictate terms from a position of force. To embark on new, more effective negotiations, it is necessary to reject both of these positions. To improve the situation, the parties to the conflict should officially reject the use of force to resolve the conflict. Both stated purposes being unrealizable, rather than indicating any loss, such a declaration could only shed the vain illusion. It would constitute a mutually beneficial exchange of the impracticable on unrealizable.

In their battles in the name of "national interests," the leaders of the parties neglect the considerable general interests of Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples, thus depriving them of the benefits of natural neighborly relations and co-operation, doomed to worsen and lag behind. Because the main psychological obstacle is a deep mutual distrust, it is time to proclaim in one form or another, preferably in a joint statement, the will to a historical reconciliation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Having articulated this high purpose, the authorities will gain the right for balanced concessions to each other, something for which the two societies are not ready yet. Concessions are inevitable, and as painful as they seem, the rewards will be rehabilitation and regional development. There is deep meaning in the motto "compromise is above victory.”

The development of events surrounding the Karabakh conflict can proceed in one of three directions: a new war, the maintenance of the status quo, or a resolution of the conflict. But the process of resolution can also evolve in different ways. Thus, all five variants of how events will develop are possible:

1. Renewal of military operations;

2. Long preservation of the condition of "neither war nor peace;"

3. A comprehensive, "package deal” solution;

4. A step-by-step resolution:

a) In essence, the two-stage solution, by which Azerbaijan tries not to consider the status of NK until occupied territories are evacuated;

b) The gradual, multi-stage process of the settlement of the conflict.

The first two options are harmful for both nations, and they should be rejected unequivocally.

1. WAR. The danger of the renewal of military actions can arise because of frequent incidents on the line of contact between hostile forces. The neutral strip separating forces is very narrow; there are no forces of separation or observers; and the parties have become oblivious to the March 6, 1995 agreement on the method of settling incidents. Nonetheless the involuntary development of incidents into war is improbable.

Direct threats "to resolve" the conflict by the use of force emanate from Azerbaijan; Azerbaijanis do not wish to be reconciled with the loss of NK and less so with the Armenian occupation of districts outside the NK borders. Baku has been conducting a bellicose campaign of words in this direction for several years, sometimes in statements by its highest officials. Basically such pronouncements have in mind domestic considerations. Of course, they are also aimed at influencing Armenians, the mediators and the international community. Sometimes these declarations take on the form of hysteria, Armenophobia and prosecution of Azerbaijanis who maintain contacts with Armenians.

The Azerbaijanis assert that the use of force in response to the occupation of occupied territories would correspond to the right of self-defense in international law. But it is quite clear that it would also constitute a violation of a number of international obligations assumed by the Azerbaijani Republic:

1. Articles 33 and 37 of the UN Charter. These call for the peaceful resolution of disputes; Article 51 recognizes the right of self-defense "if there is an armed attack" and assigns the UN Security Council the right to determine the appropriate response;

2. The principles of the OSCE concerning the peaceful resolution of disputes, the non-use of force or threat to use force;

3. Assurances made by the Azerbaijani Republic and the Republic of Armenia at the time of their entry into the Council of Europe to solve the Karabakh conflict in a peaceful way; and,

4. the cease-fire agreement which has no expiration date and which, on the whole, has been adhered to by the parties for more than ten years.

Azerbaijan can hardly risk - for the sake of renewal of war - sanctions or a threat of sanctions from the OSCE, ЕU, PACE. The commissioning of the Baku-Jeyhan oil pipeline will also not favor war. The USA, which is zealously sponsoring the project, has unambiguously supported the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

But the main obstacle to war is absolutely another problem. Azerbaijan does not have real resources for a "blitzkrieg." It is impossible to conduct quick and successful warfare without assured superiority of military forces over the opponent, an advantage Azerbaijan does not have. And the risks of a long war are unpredictable not only for the leaders of young state but also for the state itself, not to mention the incommensurable victims and burdens and a new wave of suffering. There may also be those who advocate, simplistically, a "short" war or military operations of a brief duration for the purpose of "stirring up" the international community, to scare it, in order to elicit more pity and concessions. Experience shows that it is easier to begin than to terminate a war. The consequences of such adventurous calculations run counter to Azerbaijani interests and may lead to the isolation of Azerbaijan on the international scene.

As a result, military chimeras may be considered basically as bluff and blackmail, but they are rather dangerous and harmful for new generations. It is necessary to react to them, to pay attention to them. It is necessary to untangle the knots of the conflict rationally instead of tightening them even harder.

2. NEITHER WAR, NOR PEACE. Each party vainly sings lullabies to itself that time works in its favor. Armenians expect that everyone will gradually get used to the status quo as they keep control over NK, continue the occupation of parts of the other's territories, and even dare to use and settle in sections of them. Baku builds its calculations on the inflow of petrodollars, the development of the economy, and the strengthening of its armed forces that would enable it to dictate its terms to the world from positions of force or revenge. Actually, time works against all.

The preservation of the present status quo is favorable to neither nation and the non-resolution of the conflict is inflicting huge costs on both. The status quo, in addition, imposes heavy, unproductive burdens on the budgets because of increased military expenses that prevent the reconstruction and development of these countries. Opportunities to get out of backwardness, to leave behind the degradation of the region, to enjoy the benefits of regional rehabilitation and integration are lost. Backwardness, unemployment and fear of renewal of war have led to unknown scales of migration, especially of the able-bodied population and youth. This was characteristic only of Armenians, and now it is also of Azerbaijanis.

Tension between the parties constrains democratic development of society both in Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is true that Karabakh Armenians are going to use the process of democratization even more to keep away from the Azerbaijani state, to make Europe see that it is impossible to submit NK to Azerbaijan. As a whole, the fragility and dangers of the preservation of the status quo are obvious enough. The only thing worse than this solution would be the resumption of war.

The other options (3, 4-a, 4-b) have pluses and minuses for this or that party of the conflict. The distinction between these last options cannot be reduced to methodology as is assumed sometimes: one must take into consideration such essential factors as the specific terms, the degree of irreversibility of this process, as well as the achievability of the resolution itself.

3. THE "PACKAGE DEAL" OR COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. This would be ideal: it covers and resolves all debatable issues at once, and each party precisely knows what it has received and what it has conceded. It is the best way when mutual trust is deficient, which is characteristic for the parties of this conflict. If only it was achievable in the foreseeable future!

The specificity of this conflict is in the irrepressible maximalism of the parties: The expectations of citizens are so aroused by authorities and false propaganda that any compromise and almost each concession will seem a failure, a treachery of national interests. Signing a document that involves compromises or concessions is equivalent to political suicide for any leader. It is possible to think only of camouflaged concessions, dispersed over time in their real execution and which seemed to foster hopes for a solution of the dispute favourable for given party. But there is no confidence that such camouflage will work either. Therefore for the leaders of the countries accepting a comprehensive agreement is more risky than keeping the conflict unresolved: feigning a search for acceptable compromises and not finding them works a given leader’s mandate runs out.

The essence of the "package deal" solution for Armenians is in the prompt achievement of definition of NK’s status, i.e., its independence or union with Armenia. But the "package" may also include an “catastrophe” for leaders in Baku if the latter status is accepted or for the leaders in Yerevan and Stepanakert in case NK is recognized as part of Azerbaijan. The internal conditions in both countries are not so strong that leaders could take responsibility for radical decisions with concessions on such a scale. Armenians use the occupation of seven Azerbaijani districts outside of NK to "squeeze out" of Azerbaijan their solution to the NK status problem (the "status for territories" formula) and cover their unwillingness to evacuate by arguing that these territories are the "security zone" for NK. The "package deal" favors them because it shifts the responsibility for their occupation of these districts and for their policies in them. That is why Armenians continue to chase the "package deal" although it is clear that Ilham Aliev simply cannot renew negotiations under the schemes discussed in Paris and Key West.

4. STEP-BY-STEP SOLUTION. This should not be confused with a gradual realization of the "package deal" agreement. This is the consecutive achievement and speedy realization of some complex arrangements down to the final solution of all controversial problems of the conflict. It is important that the agreed upon arrangements are already being implemented, in spite of the fact that it is not clear yet how other debatable issues will be solved.

Any step-by-step solution is an extremely delicate and fragile process. It can be disrupted halfway or at any stage with fatal consequences: renewal of war or, at least, return to the "neither war, nor peace" situation with some elements of the status quo changed. Special clarity is required in peace agreements. Ambiguous formulations, which each party can interpret in own way, are inadmissible, and full and due observance of each agreed arrangement is necessary. It is similar to the interaction of two gears where loss of one or two tooth will sharply weaken the transmission or will stop the mechanism completely. A minimum of mutual trust is absolutely necessary from the start, a trust that will grow as the plan is put into effect.

Threats to renew military operations or to settle the conflict with force are altogether incompatible with the step-by-step approach, (these are strongly contra-indicated since nobody will dare to agree to weakening of his military positions under the threat of an attack? Those who support today the step-by-step settlement and simultaneously threaten to win territories "at any cost" strengthen the positions of supporters of the "package deal" settlement. In other words, such threats make the resolution of the conflict itself more difficult. It is very important to understand the following: one accepts either step-by-step resolution process or threatens the other with the use force and revenge.

When we began to work under the step-by-step scheme in 1994-97, everything was anticipated with the strict requirement of strengthening a cease-fire and also terminating military and hostile actions with firm guarantees for their non-renewal.

The revelations of the former Minister of Defense of Azerbaijan, M. Mamedov, in his interview to the Baku newspaper "Zerkalo" (August, 28, 2004), that the cease-fire in 1994 was necessary to create a national army within approximately a year and then to renew military operations with the purpose of liberating the occupied territories show the impact of mutual distrust.

a) THE TWO-STAGE SETTLEMENT. Offered by Azerbaijan, this formula would first achieve the liberation of occupied territories, and only then engage in the solution of the of NK status problem. Armenians do not trust Azerbaijanis; when Armenians evacuate the territories, they argue, the Azerbaijanis will refuse to discuss the status issue, i.e., they will insist even more on its preservation in the structure of the Azerbaijani Republic. Thus Armenians will lose the lever of pressure on Azerbaijan, and the latter will subject NK to pressure from more advantageous positions and will hasten the withdrawal of troops or exodus of Armenians from NK.

Azerbaijanis base their line on accusing Armenia of occupation, which they equate with aggression. They frequently argue that Armenia has failed to withdraw their forces from occupied territories as required by four UNSC resolutions adopted in 1993 during the heat of military operations. The Azerbaijanis thus pick this one demand set in the resolutions, ignoring others. These four resolutions cannot be understood outside the context of the fighting in Karabakh. Among the many demands formulated in all four resolutions are the main one, the establishment of a cease-fire and the termination of military and hostile actions. But Azerbaijan ignored these demands on more than once occasion violating cease-fires during that period. Resolution 853, adopted by the UNSC after the capture of Agdam, demanded «the immediate termination of all military operations and an immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal» of the occupational forces. But that is the exact order: withdrawals after the termination of war. It is typical that later, in resolutions 874 and 884, the words "full and unconditional” are not used when referring to these withdrawals. It may be assumed that the Azerbaijani party’s failure to preserve the cease-fire (see the resolution 884) itself has transferred the liberation of territories from the unconditional requirement to a subject of negotiations.

Furthermore, in Baku’s threats to resort to force, Armenians see one more reason to not relinquish the current, strengthened line of contact.

Recently, on September 15, 2004, a meeting was held between Ilham Aliev, Robert Kocharian and Vladimir V. Putin in Astana, Kazakhstan. After this meeting a new version regarding withdrawals has appeared. The idea was to end the presence of Armenian armies in the Azerbaijani districts adjoining NK in exchange for conducting two referenda on the status of Karabakh, in NK itself and in the whole of Azerbaijan. This arrangement would be something between the "package deal" and two-stage options: First, a joint agreement on both issues would be reached; then Armenian troops would withdraw and the displaced populations would return; and then voting would be carried out on the future of NK. But there are many dangers in this variant also, dangers that can play a fatal role. It is more logical that before the withdrawal of troops, an agreement is reached on a number of issues: a) all terms and conditions regarding the return of displaced persons and involuntary immigrants; b) the modalities of carrying out of the referenda, including agreement on who has the right to vote and how are the questions in the referenda formulated; and most importantly, c) the execution of all arrangements on time. However, the results of both referenda are clear and directly contradict each other. Therefore prior to the referendum, it is necessary to answer the most difficult question: Which one of the two referenda will become the solution? And the answer to this question in advance will make the other referenda absolutely unnecessary. While resolving this issue after carrying out the referenda will break the agreement, as the parties will harden their positions, each leaning on the unequivocal will of voters. Such failure will worsen the situation; "retreat” is even more dangerous to the negotiating process than slow movement forward. An artful invention, the idea of two referenda is a movement from one impasse toward a new, even more impassable and dangerous situation. (It is necessary to remember that Ethiopia and Indonesia did not vote on the independence and secession of Eritrea and East Timor respectively).

b) THE INITIAL STEP-BY-STEP OR MULTI-STAGE SETTLEMENT. The importance of a settlement in Karabakh is recognized by all parties and the entire international community; and experience has shown that rare and brief meetings of presidents or foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot replace the normal negotiating process. The co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, leaning on the decision of the Budapest Summit (the highest and most detailed decision about Karabakh in the OSCE system) should take the initiative. They should propose that all parties proceed to more regular, intensive and effective negotiations between plenipotentiary delegations at the governmental level.

It is important to structure negotiations the right way, to remove the obstacles that have arisen because of the maximalism of the parties. Now the parties refuse to consider other questions until agreement is reached on the problem that is a priority for them: status of NK for Armenians, liberation of territories for Azerbaijanis. The compromise could consist of the simultaneous consideration of all problems of the conflict (without any exclusions and privileges). Then both the status of NK and the liberation of the territories would be on the table of negotiations alongside with other items, but would not exclude each other.

It would be desirable to negotiate on four "tracks," considering simultaneously (or rather, alternately) four questions: 1) strengthening of an armistice mode; 2) temporary status of NK and elements of the final one; 3) liberation of the occupied territories and return of displaced persons; 4) all other leading toward a normalization of the situation. Such an approach would provide room for combinations of "give and takes" to search for “pairs of exchanges” (including within the framework of each item, there asymmetrically). The pragmatism of "transactions" is more realistic than unending disputes on the supremacy of a principle (territorial integrity vs. the right of nations to self-determination). Alternation of "tracks" would go under the arrangement of the parties or under the decision of intermediaries. Exchanges would begin not from the main questions, but auxiliary ones. Full stagnation would be replaced if not by dynamism but at least by gradual, modest steps.

Divergences on the format of negotiations can also be removed: the more general questions can be discussed by all three delegations (Azerbaijan, Armenia and NK). Specific, narrower ones could be handled by the delegation of Azerbaijan with either the delegation of Armenia or that of NK. In the latter case, the third delegation would be present only as an observer, without the right to express itself. The valuable resource of daily work in a lobby, which is not present now, will be evident in such an arrangement.

Of course, such a scheme of negotiations is not a panacea. It provides only a means to move from a 10-year impasse to the first results, to gradually decrease the intensity of the situation and improve conditions in an area that houses the most complex conflict on the post-Soviet space. Its advantage is only in overcoming both deadlocked approaches: 1) the demand for a "package" solution of all problems that actually blocks settlement; 2) transition to this scheme and , strangely enough , even its refusal will prevent the flare-up of the atmosphere around Karabakh and the threat of renewed war.

It is important to understand that we are not speaking about a quick settlement of the Karabakh problem, yet. The major value is this scheme is the preservation of the control over a situation by the international community, the prevention of its degradation and slippage into war, and the mitigation of tension and possible convulsions.

THE OSCE MINSK GROUP PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT is ambiguous. Long and persevering efforts on a reduction of the international control over the situation around NK developed following the cease-fire may be attributed to the positive aspects of the Minsk process. Supporting the Minsk process, it is necessary to take into account that considered, constructive criticism is more useful than ceremonial compliments to the OSCE MG. From the beginning, Russia stood for sober analysis and took steps to increase its effectiveness. Russia is responsible, for example, for drafting the operative rules of conflict resolution, March, 1993; and the project of the mandate of the MG, October, 1994. Very few people know that the MG emerged spontaneously, without any decision of the OSCE bodies, becoming a unique structure within an all-European organization without a precise mandate.

The success of mediation depends not on the number of states participating in it, but on a complex of factors. It is more likely that too many intermediaries may become a hindrance. It is one thing to speak of the 11 member Minsk Conference, if it was ever to convene; and it is absolutely another thing to consider the "neutral" nine of the so-called Minsk Group (the 11 minus Azerbaijan and Armenia), which replaced the Conference and was called upon to engage operatively in the mediation process without the appropriate mandate. As noted at the outset, under the influence of major powers, the MG has made a serious miscalculation on the question of the interests relevant to the settlement of the conflict.

It was quite obvious that because of the large number of objective criteria for movement toward a settlement, Russia had the best chances and it achieved actual results. This was attested to also in the documents of that time. Resolutions of the UNSC, the decision of the OSCE Budapest Summit noted "the decisive contribution of the Russian Federation". Instead of support of Russia’s efforts and of the use of its unique opportunities for localizing and curtailing the conflict, the MG has followed the preferences of the powers interested in the decrease of Russian influence in Transcaucasia and the disintegration of the post-Soviet space.

This was shown vividly in the battle to bring to an end military operations. If for Russia and the CIS countries an absolute priority was to end the bloodshed, there were other purposes of greater importance for a number of our partners in the MG. (For example, to ensure the continuity of the negotiating process. On this point, one could see the differences in the cease-fire proposals in the spring of 1993, after the fall of Kelbajar). Moreover, the MG and same his members hindered the Moscow’s mediation efforts. The agreement between Russia, the USA and Sweden (Stockholm, January, 1994) that the mediators would not hinder each other's efforts was violated within a few days, compelling the president of the Russian Federation to send a message to the president of the USA. The more than self-restrained response of the MG to the cease-fire achieved by Russia on May 12, 1994 is characteristic of this.

It is possible to note the large number of Russian proposals accepted by the MG later, but only after initial resistance. These include a recognition of three parties in the conflict; the creation of the joint coordination commission; the usefulness of direct contacts between the parties; the necessity of providing a legal basis to documents, to obligate the parties to respect them; the study of the problems of Lachin and Shushi, etc. The unwillingness of MG to cooperate with CIS countries, though the conflict was in the Commonwealth region, and the refusal to accept Kazakhstan in the MG are rather eloquent examples.

The frailty of the MG as a negotiation mechanism became obvious in 1994, and its role was passed to its co-chairmen. Negotiations within the framework of the MG are quite often referred to, but there are no Minsk Group negotiations. The Minsk Group is only a symbol of multilateral diplomacy, and its role is, practically, solely consultative.

There are several questions also about the activities of the co-chairmen. Their departure from the decisions of the OSCE Budapest Summit, their passivity concerning the deformation of the negotiation process and elimination of NK as a third party to the negotiations, their rejection of former methods of work (direct negotiations) with the parties, their self-restriction when "assisting" meetings of presidents and ministers of foreign affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia, their indifference to regular threats of resorting to the use force for the resolution of the conflict provide sufficient proof. Nevertheless, it is important to maintain the OSCE mechanism involved in the resolution of the Karabakh, to speed up its work, and to avoid duplication by other international organizations less familiar with Karabakh.