Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov letter
to Mr. David Atkinson
Moscow, December 3, 2004
Dear Mr. David Atkinson,
I am the Russian Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, I am writing this letter in connection with the PACE draft documents on Nagorno Karabakh (I was engaged in the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in the hottest period of the war, in 1992-96, I was the head of Russia's mediatory mission, the plenipotentiary of the President of the Russian Federation on Nagorno Karabakh, also I was a participant and the Russian co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, participated in stopping the military operations and continue to follow the Karabakh events).
1. I'll start with Russia's role, which is in no way reflected in the PACE materials. Moreover, clause 6 of the draft Resolution proposes to express gratitude to the Minsk Group co-chairmen and the personal representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for their tireless efforts, especially for the achievement of cease-fire since May 12 1994.
It's widely known that the
cease-fire in Nagorno Karabakh was achieved with mediation of
Security Council in its Resolutions 874 (1993) and 884 (1993) wasn't ashamed of
mentioning Russia's mediatory efforts and the OSCE Budapest summit (1994) did
it three times, it expressed gratitude for the "decisive contribution of
the Russian Federation." Don't the experts preparing draft documents for
the PACE Rapporteur know this? Or, maybe, they
preferred, against the facts, not to mention
This should not be done also because, at first, the OSCE tried even to ignore the truce achieved by Russia (just a week later, on May 19, 1994, the Standing Committee adopted a document meaning as if nothing had taken place). The OSCE guides persistently call the cease-fire “unofficial”. It's desirable that the history should be written more accurately, and reliably.
important international documents on the Karabakh settlement have always been
prepared on a balanced base in order to make it easy for the sides to
make compromises. None of them was as biased, with a shift in favor of
The respectful attitude to your predecessor, Mr. Terry Davis, and the short term of your work on the Report are quite understandable. However, being as close to the truth, to unbiased estimation of the conflict, as possible, should remain the main target. Faults and disagreements with the OSCE, which is involved in the settlement process, should be avoided, as they may cause confusion, hamper its work. The draft has failed to avoid this yet.
3. One of
the main reasons is, evidently, that the prehistory of the conflict, the
process of military operations in 1992-94, the settlement process, the
attitude of the sides of the conflict to the international documents and
peace-making initiatives weren't completely taken into account. And all this
had an impact on the current tense situation. Many problems in the Karabakh
conflict arose due to joint fault of all sides (ethnic cleansings,
occupations, rapid growth of the number of refugees and displaced persons), meanwhile in your drafts this blame is, in fact, laid
only upon the Armenian sides. I don't need to justify them at all, but an
unbiased estimation of the line of actions of all sides is necessary,
4. The selective references to the main international documents (UN Security Council Resolutions, decisions within the OSCE system) are rather dangerous. The sides willingly pick up only everything beneficial for them ignoring the rest and deviating from the fulfillment of obligations imposed on them by these documents.
Resolution touches upon the UN Security Council Resolutions and the decisions
of the March 24 1992 Helsinki additional meeting of the Council of Ministers
of the CESE but the decision of the December 6 1994 OSCE Budapest summit, the
highest and most detailed decision on the negotiations, isn't mentioned.
Budapest summit took place after the sharpest, military stage of the
conflict. The heads of 52 states instructed not the Minsk Group but its
Co-chairmen to hold negotiations between the parties to the conflict.
We are still at that very stage, the negotiations should be held not only
5. In the UN
Security Council Resolutions and OSCE documents (for instance, the March 31
1995 statement of the Chairmen-in-Office and proposals of the Co-chairmen of
OSCE Minsk Group in 1997-98) Nagorno Karabakh is now indirectly now directly
recognized a party to the conflict (only Azerbaijan, not willing to have a
direct contact with this party - against the UN Security Council's appeals -
denies this). Your drafts of Resolution and Recommendations nearly leave out
this issue, the conflict is only reduced to
Karabakh's Armenians shouldn't have
been used in the PACE either. (Its main population was called a
community. May we say "British community of
6. The drafts contain references to 4 Resolutions of the UN Security Council, but only the demand to withdraw the occupation forces was accentuated. The whole complex of demands of these Resolutions, including the most important issue, namely, how timely and completely the parties fulfilled them, remains aloof. These Resolutions may be adequately interpreted only taking into account the conditions of their adoption and the hierarchy of demands and appeals by meaning. All four Resolutions were adopted at the peak of the military operations (April-November 1993). That's why it's natural that their most principal, key demand was to cease fire, military operations and hostile acts. I am acquainted with the facts of that period like no one else.
period and later, till May 1994, i.e. more than a year Azerbaijan's
leadership persistently ignored the main demands of all 4 Resolutions and
continued staking on the forcible solution of the conflict, several times
violated the cease-fire, deviated from agreements about it and from other
Resolution No 853 demanded unconditional withdrawal of occupation forces, but the next Resolutions, No 874 and 884, didn't contain this word, as the UN Security Council couldn't have "awarded" one of the parties for the sabotage of its Resolutions! The formulations of Resolution No 884 are eloquent. We can't but take into consideration that, as a result, the withdrawal of troops became and was the subject of negotiations between the parties to the conflict.
7. The fact
8. Clause 8 of your Report claims
that 8 regions of
9. The idea of the establishment of a PACE ad-hoc committee on Nagorno Karabakh gives rise to doubt. Of course, this is the business of the PACE but is it worth establishing structures parallel to the OSCE Minsk Group? The parties will constantly seek out the difference in the positions of two or more structures in order to use this, at least, in the propaganda, which is at present doing harm "both sides of the barricade," hampers the settlement.
The draft also contains a number of provisions not coinciding with the consideration of these issues in the negotiation process within the framework of the OSCE. I have many remarks on a number of other clauses of your documents as well, but I won't go into details. I am ready to announce them concretely by points if necessary.
10. The titles of your drafts
contain a duplication, like a tautology. The formulation "conflict, in
which the OSCE
Dear Mr. David Atkinson,
isn't at all aimed at laying the blame for non-resolution of the Karabakh
I am sure that such an authoritative organization as the PACE could have displayed a more balanced approach to the problems of the settlement of the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh.
With best wishes