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A lot of additional and, what is more important, artificial
difficulties in the process of the settlement of the Karabakh conflict are
established by Baku due to the fact that Nagorno Karabakh (NK) isn't
recognized by it as a party to the conflict, and is estranged and moved away
from the negotiations in every way.
NK, which is the kernel, the heart of the conflict, can't
be its object only. The population of Nagorno Karabakh is vitally
interested in the settlement of the conflict, far more than the rest of
residents of Azerbaijan and Armenia are. Whereas the main part of the latter ones is traumatized
only with the fact that the conflict damaged their being, national pride,
prestige, the sense of justice to some extent, for all the NKR residents (for
present Armenian population and for its former Azerbaijan population) it is
an issue of survival in its direct sense. The status of the NKR is the
main reason and main disputable problem of this conflict.
NK is a knot of long-standing contradictions due to mixed
settlement of different ethnos. Still the League of Nations considered it as a disputable territory. It was considered as a
disputable territory also by the Russian Soviet Federative Republic and Armenia (see the agreement between them signed in 1920). In the 1920s, Azerbaijan's authorities performed a series of administrative
manipulations (establishing and soon afterward abolishing "Red
Kurdistan"), thus re-formed the districts in the zone of Lachin, and moved the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region
away from Armenia by 6 kilometers.
The isolation of NK's prevailing
ethnos from "the kindred mainland" lasting 70 years and the
continuous shifts of demographic proportions (not only by natural way, but
also as a result of a definite demographic policy), could turn Nagorno Karabakh into a resemblance of Nakhichevan or contemporary Kosovo.
The Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh making 3/4 of NK's population in 1989 were immediately and en masse
involved in the conflict, including the military operations proportionally
much wider than the residents of Azerbaijan or the Armenians of Armenia. They had their military units and managed them really and
effectively enough. And it is the main point in this issue: Nagorno
Karabakh is, no doubt, a party to the conflict, it
must be a subject, a participant of the negotiations.
* * *
And what do the history of the conflict and the process of
its settlement say in this respect? Which was Baku's previous approach to the direct contacts with Stepanakert and to NK's
participation in the negotiations? How was this issue reflected on the UN
Security Council resolutions, the OSCE decisions and actions, in the
negotiation process, as well as in the mediators' practice? Here are the
facts.
- Not only Armenia and Azerbaijan but also the leadership of the Armenians of Karabakh attended
the meeting of the parties to the conflict in Zheleznovodsk
on September 23, 1991.
- In July 1992, the CSCE Minsk Group sent, upon the initiative
of Russia, a challenge to the three conflicting sides, i.e. Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert to
cease the military operations during 30 days. Another appeal, to cease the
military operations during 60 days, was sent in August. The answers were
expected from the three sides.
- The first confidential contact between a plenipotentiary of
the Republic of Azerbaijan and a representative of the leadership of the Armenians of
Nagorno Karabakh was held on 12 September, 1992 (still under A. Elchibei and with his
consent). The two sides wished to periodically continue the confidential
contacts. Several private meetings were held with the support of Russia (for example, on 9-16 April, 1993).
- Direct contacts on telephone and fax emerged, and private
meetings continued after H. Aliyev's coming to
power in summer 1993. They took place upon the initiative of the Azeri side,
usually as the conditions on the front became unfavorable for it. Baku's correspondence with the Armenians of Karabakh (directly or through the Russian
mediator) is preserved, as a rule, letters are on official blanks with
concrete addresses ("the Ministry of Defense of Nagorno
Karabakh"; “To the leadership of
Nagorno Karabakh”). Baku used the term "party" towards the Armenians of
Karabakh, and it not always insisted on Armenia's joining the signing of documents. Naturally, it wasn't the
recognition of "the NKR", but it confirmed unambiguously that Baku considered Nagorno Karabakh as a confronting party.
- It were Baku and Stepanakert, i.e. without Yerevan’s participation, that
concluded all the first agreements on the restriction of military operations
and cease-fire. A total of 10 such agreements were reached, generally through
the mediation of Russia. [There were only three exclusions when NK wasn't presented during signing
of documents: 1) political declaration
Ter-Petrosian-Mamedov in Tehran on May 8, 1992 (it
was defeated just by the Karabakh Armenians who captured Shusha); 2) the
agreement of three Ministries of Foreign Affairs about cease-fire starting
September 1, 1992 signed in Alma-Ata; 3) an agreement on the halt of the
military operations organized by P. Grachev (Sochi, September 19, 1992).]
- The UN Security Council, without recognizing the NKR
statehood, at the same time saw in it as a party to the conflict. Reading of
the UN Security Council's four 1993 resolutions leaves no doubts about it.
The Security Council mentioned the military operations of “local Armenian
forces” in the resolutions, calling on Armenia to have influence upon them, thus fixing NK's
autonomous enough role in the conflict.
- Sometimes NK took its stand different from Armenia's (L. Ter-Petrosian's visit to Goris
and Stepanakert in June 1993 wasn’t accidental). There were cases, when Baku and Yerevan accepted the proposals of the Minsk Group, but it also needed Stepanakert's consent, and it continued pressure
upon Stepanakert. It wouldn't be necessary if NK
wasn't a conflicting side. You see, there was Yerevan's consent anyway...
- A number of direct bilateral meetings, both open and
private ones, of the representatives of Baku and Stepanakert was held in 1993. When A. Jalilov and A.Ghoukassian
for the first time met officially in Moscow on September 12-13, they were representatives of the
leaderships of Azerbaijan and NK (and even approved a joint communiqué). The top
leaders of the parties, including H. Aliyev and
R. Kocharian met (privately) on
September 25. Later the Russian mediator eight (!) times arranged with H. Aliyev about the continuation of Baku-Stepanakert
secrete direct contacts, but the latter found excuses to delay and eventually
fail the fulfillment of his promise every time. Two last times H. Aliyev returned to this issue upon his own initiative.
The agreement on cease fire which has been observed for over ten
years now since May 12, 1994, was reached through the mediation of Russia between the three patties to the conflict, i.e. between
those who really had armed forces and enacted them in this conflict. In
the document signed by the AR Minister of Defense with H. Aliyev's
approval in Baku on May 9, the posts of his two signing partners of the
agreement - the Minister of Defense of Armenia and the Commander of the
Nagorno Karabakh Army - were mentioned at the same level.
- The negotiations on the draft agreement on the cease of the
armed conflict started through the mediation of Russia (Moscow, August 5-13, 1994) immediately in the format of the three
conflicting parties.
- Negotiations of the leaders of the conflicting parties were
held in Moscow on September 8-9, 1994 with the support of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Russia: bilateral negotiations (H. Aliyev - L. Ter-Petrosian; H.
Aliyev - R. Kocharian),
then trilateral talks with the participation of the NKR leaders took
place. Whom the head of Azerbaijan had to do with this time in the person of the NKR leaders, but
for a conflicting party?
The OSCE Budapest summit (5-6 December 1994) approved the
negotiation mechanism for the conclusion of the agreement on the stoppage of
the armed conflict, instructing the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group to carry on negotiations
between the parties to the conflict. This format differed from the one
outlined by the Ministerial Council of CSCE in 1992 for the Minsk conference (11 states and two parties concerned). One
cannot but see the difference between the decision of March 24, 1992, which
was made before the height of the military operations in Karabakh (it lacked
even a “party to the conflict” notion) and the decision of the Budapest
summit made after the end of the military operations. Budapest as if adopted the format of the Moscow negotiations and passed them under the aegis of the
OSCE. The wording "all the parties" (not the”two
parties”) in the Budapest summit is not casual. The decision of the OSCE summit in Budapest was made with the personal participation of H. Aliyev
and L. Ter-Petrosian.
- During the 1st meeting of the Senior Council
(Prague, 31 March, 1995), in response to the attempts of Azerbaijan to
contest after the Budapest summit the configuration of the conflict, the OSCE
Chairman-in-office directly stated the participation of the two State parties
to the conflict (Azerbaijan and Armenia) "and the other conflicting
party (Nagorno Karabakh)".
- In accordance with the decision of the OSCE Budapest summit,
the negotiations were held by the Co-Chairmen between the three parties to
the conflict. It was emphasized even through the rectangular
distribution of the delegations at the hall. (Later, in response to the
participation of the NKR delegation, the Azerbaijani delegation began to seat
N.Bahmanov as if separately, imitating another
delegation. The Co-Chairmen, of
course, haven't ever recognized it, reckoning him within the Azerbaijani
delegation. Respecting N. Bahmanov, at the same time it was impossible to consider him as a
representative of the separate conflicting party).
- During the meeting of the heads of the parliaments of
Azerbaijan, Armenia, as well as the NK elected body in Bishkek on May 4-5, 1994 the
attempt to pose N. Bahmanov not as an ordinary MP,
but as yet another “party", almost a parliamentary structure, was
a real caricature. In deed he wasn't even an elected municipal
representative, as he worked briefly in Shusha in
the executive power body.
- In 1997-98, the
Co-Chairmen directed the three known suggestions to the three addresses
and needed the answers of each of the three parties, including Stepanakert. Everyone who read the text of suggestions
saw that the Co-Chairmen directly wrote about the three parties to the
conflict for many times and among them directly mentioned NK.
-
The Co-Chairmen have had to deal with three parties to the
conflict till now. Arriving in the region they visit, as a rule, not only Baku and Yerevan, but also Stepanakert. These
actions were carried out by the mediators, including the Co-Chairmen,
regardless of the insistent demands of Baku not to visit Stepanakert,
to have to do with the leaders of NK only at the same level with N. Bahmanov etc. I remember how
H. Aliyev tried in Baku to
persuade Y. Primakov to avoid traveling to Stepanakert, but failed. For this reason, the recent
mollifying statement of E. Memedyarov that the
Co-Chairmen travel to NK at permission of Baku,
is ambiguous. The problem is that Baku
does not want to understand the difference between intergovernmental contacts
in a normal situation and the specific situations of conflict resolution,
when contacting all the parties is an axiomatic requirement of mediation. By
agreeing to accept mediation one automatically “permits” contacts with the
opposite party, no other permissions are required.
Sometimes, taking into account apprehensibility of Baku, the mediators allowed themselves to meet Baku half-way. For example, they refrained from visiting Stepanakert, but it's all the same, held meetings with
the NK leaders in Yerevan. Only this fact shows that, by taking unrealistic position, Baku dooms itself to incomprehension, isolation, wittingly losing
situation in this issue. At the same time it is one of the main obstacles in
the way of the settlement, undoubtedly, the main one among the procedures.
* * *
Baku has cut down sharply its direct contacts with Stepanakert since late 1993 and, becoming entangled in
inconsequence, to the detriment of the consideration of the real problems of
the settlement, began a many years long procedural fuss, refusing Nagorno
Karabakh in the status of the conflicting party and in hindering its
participation in the negotiations. This contradicts to international practice
of settlement of the conflicts (the Abkhazians, Transnistrians,
South Ossetians are recognized the parties to the
conflicts, meetings of Shevarnadze with Ardzinba, of Luchinsky and Voronin with
Smirnov, Rarkhmonov with Nuri,
Arafat with the leaders of Israel are known).
H. Aliyev hesitated in this issue. In
his conversations with mediators he once used to say that "NK is a
conflicting party, not more", and the mediators
agreed with him. The idea of recognition of NK as party to the conflict had
among the leaders of Azerbaijan both supporters (speaker R. Guliev)
and opponents (Minister of Foreign Affairs H. Hasanov).
It is possible that the current toughness of Baku is partially explained by the home political discords in 1996
between H. Aliev and R. Guliev,
who recognized NK as a party to the conflict in his public statements.
Baku's persistence has no intelligible ground,
it is more like a despotic caprice as regards those who are considered as
fellow citizens there. It obviously discredits promises to give the NK
population “the widest autonomy." Fears that the status of a party to
the conflict will increase NK's chances for the
recognition as a state or a subject of the international law are ungrounded:
no state, including Armenia, has recognized "the NKR". The arguments advanced by Baku for justification of its current position - at first the
negotiations with Armenia, then, after its "going away", with NK are arbitrary
and have no grounds in the OSCE system.
Other "arguments" aren't also stronger: they say, the
conflict is with Armenia, not with
NK ("aggression of Armenia"); they say, Armenia and NK act jointly, they are a single whole; the Azeri community of NK has the same
rights as the Armenian one. This latter is obviously not correct. It is rather the Armenian “community” than the Azeri one
to which the autonomous status of NKAO was given. The term
"community" is also unfit to the main population of the autonomous
region.
The position of Baku to some extent has a "psychological" origin too. The
deviation of NK from the negotiations is considered as the success of the
political-diplomatic efforts, and it partially serves as moral compensation
for military failure. But, in essence, it is "Pyrrhic victory" as
any agreement will need NK's consent.
* * *
The dialogue of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1999-2001 and 2003-2004 was an exclusive format of
negotiation, as RA President Robert Kocharian, due
to his former role, as if represented Nagorno Karabakh as well. At the
same time, it was his mistake, an overestimation of his abilities. After over
20 meetings of the two Presidents gave no result, the Co-Chairmen had to
revive the negotiation process, and they naturally suggested that the
negotiations should be resumed in the trilateral format.
In essence, the compromise concerning the meetings of Deputy
Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Prague was the Co-Chairmen's
concession to Baku's whims. The meetings at
that level weren't able to bring to agreements on the essence of the
conflict. In fact, with this imitation of negotiations both Presidents
and the Co-Chairmen avoided the unpleasant admission of the fact that there
was a deadlock or vacuum in the negotiation process. Calling this format a
"negotiation mechanism" was an obvious mistake made by the
Co-Chairmen. This would rather be only a "contact mechanism"
as Azerbaijan and Armenia have no normal diplomatic relations yet. The failure of this
format from the viewpoint of the negotiation process was quite predictable.
The negotiation mechanism was defined by the highest
instance of the OSCE – the Budapest summit, the heads of 52 OSCE-member states. The Co-Chairmen
themselves are hardly ever competent to reshape it and all the more the
parties. No other decisions on the mechanism of negotiations on Karabakh have
been made at such a level since then. The former negotiations were only
temporarily stopped in March 1997. That's why the trilateral format should be
taken into consideration while their resumption.
* * *
The paradox is that hypertrophying the meaning of procedure
issues evidently to the detriment of the essence of settlement problems, Baku's tactics (no
matter whatever its reason) in practice helps the Armenian sides to
temporize. After all, all the same most of the issues of settlement are
to be worked out with participation of Nagorno Karabakh's representatives,
as the settlement just can't be achieved without taking into consideration
the interests of Nagorno Karabakh’s population.
Displaying inconsistency in this issue as well, Baku on its own sticks to its position, being unable to refute the
fact that it did maintain contacts with NK just as a party to the conflict.
Even Turkey doesn't dispute the Co-Chairmen's position about three parties
to this conflict.
However, it should be mentioned that the Co-Chairmen
themselves aren't consistent enough. Being constantly perplexed at the
"rescuing" of the negotiation process they consider it tactically
inexpedient to aggravate the procedural disagreements with Baku, which in
practice has already seriously complicated transition to effective
negotiations, the process of settlement on the whole.
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