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BREAKTHROUGH IN RAMBOUILLET
WOULD BE A LEAP IN THE DARK IF THE PUBLIC IS NOT PREPARED BEFOREHAND |
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What is your assessment of the regular talks about
"the window of opportunities" in the settlement of the conflict? Do
you think real the recently activated statements on possible resolution of
the conflict in the current year and the "breakthrough" at the
meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in Rambouillet?
There is really a window of relative opportunities
for 2006, but it is unbelievable that Ilham Alieyv and Robert Kocharyan
will use it and "jump out" of the conflict frames. Impartial
opportunities are not enough. A strong political will and thorough work
inside the public are required in order that the public perceives the
inevitability of mutual concessions for the parties to meet somewhere on the
half-way. Such a "breakthrough" in Rambouillet
would be a leap in the dark if the public is not prepared beforehand. Do you
agree with the opinion that creation of a model for settlement of conflicts
is possible? Do you think that all the conflicts in the
post-Soviet area can be equalized or you think that every conflict is unique
and requires a specific approach? One should avoid both the extremes, the search for a
single mould for the conflicts neglecting their specifics and the absolutization of each conflict making it unique and
neglecting any commonness. The specifics must be taken into account, indeed,
but one should not forget that all these conflicts originated or have became
aggravated in the background of powerful shocks - during the collapse of the It explains the inability of the international
community to insert the settlement of these conflicts in of standards
registered in Helsinki not for such force-majour
circumstances, but to overcome the aftermath of the World War I and to
support normal relations of the countries. irrespective of their regimes. It
is like demanding imperishability of the inner walls of a collapsing building
during an earthquake. Neither the norms of navigation are used during a
storm. Conflicts must not be settled on the basis of a
"favorite" principle (right to self-determination or territorial
integrity). Moreover, two quite different principles become weighty: peaceful
settlement of conflicts, non-use of force or threatening with force. What is the role of national and international NGOs
in the settlement of Karabakh conflict? The International Crisis Group is in
question. The article by the research officer of the Russian Academy of
Sciences Institute of State and Law, the expert of the Strategic Culture
Foundation, Andrey Areshev,
brings an unequivocal information on the "pro-Turkish" orientation
of the ICG. Do you agree with this? I can see the role of national NGOs in it rather
than the international ones. Three months ago I made a special call for
activation of Armenian and Azerbaijani NGOs before 2006 and its "window
of opportunities." It requires revival of the national diplomacy,
elementary contacts of Azerbaijanis and Armenians, a reasoned repulse of
noisy pseudo-patriots and those who implant isolation of the two neighboring
peoples and thoughtlessly call for a new war. International NGOs could contribute to restoration
of these contacts rather than propose settlement ways. And the ICG is
absorbed just by the last, with its schemes often not being in accordance
with the conflict nature. Let alone the improper, "directive" tone
of recommendations of ICG representatives and their shameless lobbying of EU
interests. Andrey Areshev brought many facts on the personnel of ICG
leadership, their ties and propensity. Not disputing this, I pay much
attention to the essence of its proposals. I prefer neither admitting
everything at once nor rejecting, but separating the useful and the useless,
and sometime the unfavorable. For example, the first report of ICG quite
uselessly describes the conflict as inter-community. The Armenians of
Karabakh confronted with Whether the special services of super powers have
their part in the conflict's settlement? I think the role of the special services in the settlement
of the conflict is insignificant. However, they can use the conflict
environment for their own purposes. The role of diplomacy and propaganda is
much higher but different so far. If the propaganda helped or at least did
not prevent diplomatic efforts, the situation would be different. NGOs have a
little part, but could or rather should become an "antidote" for
the present harmful propaganda. Do you think necessary dislocation of international
peacemaking forces in the zone of the Karabakh conflict? If yeas, so who can
join the peacemaking mission given the statements of the Armenian party on
inadmissibility of Turkish troops in Nagorny
Karabakh and the Azerbaijan's demands for nonparticipation of OSCE MG
member-countries in the peacemaking mission? Both the questions depend, first of all, on the
conflicting parties. They must judge if they are able to independently
enforce the agreements everyone has waited for for
so many years. The last experience is not encouraging. During the 18 years of
the conflict, only three agreements were reached and only one of them is
observed and even improperly. Let alone that during the military actions the
agreements on their limitation or suspension were broken more frequently than
observed, especially by one party. And all this in conditions of comparative statics. What will be in the dynamics of stage by stage
fulfillment of future agreements? After all, it is like shedding of one or
several cogs of a pinion i.e. the mechanism no longer works, it stops. The first issue must be solved, at first. That is,
whether the conflict's settlement need peacemakers. Beforehand, an agreement
on key issues or at least an approach to their solution is necessary. Only
after this the national staff of peacemakers must be determined. It will
require agreement of all the conflicting parties. If the settlement of the conflict without
participation of Nagorny Karabakh in the talks is
possible despite the statements that " I came out for participation of all the conflicting
parties in the negotiation process long ago. At the beginning of the talks Nagorny Karabakh participated both in the conflict and
the talks. I think deviation from this was the mistake of the Armenian
diplomacy and the feebleness of OSCE which agreed to work in the present
inferior format. After all, Budapest Summit of OSCE instructed the Minsk
Group co-chairmen to hold negotiations between the conflicting parties and
not between the recognized countries only. This instruction is dated I am greatly surprised at the statement by OSCE CIO Karel de Gucht at a press
conference on January 24 when he tried to reason the non-participation of Nagorny Karabakh in the talks by its unrecognized status.
After all, it is not a UN membership, and there are dozens of UN
member-states who does not recognized each other. Is it possible that before
the visit to Yerevan and Baku the experienced Belgian diplomacy did not
inform its minister, who occupies so high position at OSCE, either of the
Budapest Summit, or of the history of the talks, or of the practice of
participation of the conflicting parties and not only the recognized states
in the settlement of conflicts. Is it possible to stop the militarist statements by It is very desirable that the two peoples become
friends, but it is difficult, especially when some people intentionally
cultivate distrust and hostility between them. The flow of militarist statements by official But, despite these and many other difficulties, I believe
that an access to the dynamics of the settlement is possible. It is most
likely by 2010 after painful stalling in 2007-2008. It would be good for the
parties to reject this supposition and make progress already in the current
year.
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