«Íigh-lights» (Yerevan), July 24, 2006

 

 

 

To discourage solving issues by threats and blood

         (or: Reject war as means of solving international conflicts)

By Vladimir Kazimirov

From the Editor

This article of Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, the former Russian envoy for the Nagorno Karabakh problem, was disseminated by the Regnum news agency. It presents a comprehensive overview of the current situation around the NK conflict in the light of the recent developments, in particular, the partial disclosure of the details of the proposals by the Minsk group Co-Chairman.

 

The report on Karabakh presented by the Minsk Group Co-chairs to the OSCE Permanent Council and their statements half-opened the content of secret consultations between the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia on sensitive issues of the Nagorno Karbakh (NK) conflict settlement.

 The Co-Chairs’ goal evidently was not only to account at OSCE and exert pressure upon the leaders of the conflict parties, but also to start “to prepare for peace” their public opinions, i.e., to do the job which the leaders themselves were expected to. Now discussion is going on about the advantages and disadvantages of the settlement course for each side, but, to ensure peace, it is worth to have a wider look at it.

Some media presented texts of the report and the statements with a great deal of inaccuracies in translations, which gives rise to false rumors. As far as more Armenians and Azerbaijanis know Russian better, it is more useful to prepare originals of documents in this language: for at the present, translations into English done in Vienna are of better quality, than translations from English are in the South Caucasus.

I start with, as it would seem, formal fault-finding in the texts of the Co-Chairmen. They should not have used in vain the significant terms: principles and agreement. There is no ground for speaking about “basic principles” here, and there is even less ground to speak about a  frame agreement.” Only general outlines of the settlement have been prepared. No principles, especially new ones, are seen.

True, the Co-Chairs try to introduce two real principles in Karabakh extremely important in conflict situations: non-application of force and threats of force; peaceful settlement of disputes.

And they should be provided a world support in it! 

It is also too early to speak about an agreement, even a frame one. Even if the “principles” were adopted, this would give the two parties only a political consent, but would not guarantee coming to an agreement yet. Each element would require long-winded negotiations in order to ripen for inclusion in full-value, legally binding agreements.

There are also problems with the number of the parties to an agreement. It does not fit to the Co-Chairs to suppose that “perhaps Yerevan will prevail upon Stepanakert.” How to oblige the Armenians of NK to withdraw their military units from 5 regions beyond its boundaries without their signature? And to what line to take these units? Agreement of all parties of the conflict, all who are to fulfil commitments is necessary (as it was with the ceasefire of May 12, 1994). It cannot be another way, even if not everybody likes it.

Therefore, the carelessness in the Vienna text is surprising, in which formulas such as “two parties,” “both parties” are included. The three parties to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict were recognized long ago in the OSCE documents and by the Co-Chairs themselves. By whom and when was this approach revised? Where can we find such a decision?  The very conformism before someone’s caprices, “creeping” concessions for the sake of continuing negotiations (no matter how effective they are) result in deadlines and failures. And the result is evident.

 The Co-Chairs announce themselves successors of achievements of only the last 9 years. What a strange calculation! The U.S. and France were adopted this role in early 1997, but Russia was both a Co-Chair and an independent mediator earlier, too. The OSCE Minsk Group had other Chairs and Co-Chairs too. A great number of regulation ideas have been worked out very long ago. And the whole work of the mediators is built on the ceasefire reached with Russia’s mediation in 1994.

But let’s pass to the most important, to the essence of the problem. One should not start the settlement process peacefully (withdrawal from seized territories) and afterwards take no care what happens. The

Co-Chairs speak about the stability of the peace process and guarantees only casually, at end of the list of the proposed measures. Absolute renunciation of force by all conflict sides, refusal of any attempts to resume violence should become the primary “unconditional condition“ (sine qua non). It will require stipulation in the international level as well, perhaps, at the UN Security Council. This must in no case be left just outlined and unfinished. This is like finishing “the ground level” of a building construction before starting other levels.

Threats to the peaceful process mainly come from Azerbaijan fed by its failures in the war. This is widely known and seen with a naked eye (bellicose statements, appeals for arms race and revenge, instigation of hostility towards Armenians, breaking off contacts with them, etc.). It is characteristic that Baku rejects the mediators’ proposals more often and to a larger extent. Therefore, the positions and arguments of Azerbaijan should be traced more carefully, it should be revealed and indicated what is unacceptable in their statements and why. 

The Co-Chair’s current scheme is “majority of territories in exchange for the promise of a referendum on the status of Nagorno Karabakh” (it is not clear what a referendum and when). It envisages Armenians’ leaving 5 regions, and almost everything essential of the remaining hangs in an uncertainty. It is naïve to expect that the sides will reach an agreement on the referendum later. Hence, no referendum will be held at all. At least the unsolved problem of the Nagorno Karabakh status - the main problem of the conflict, the problems of Kelbajar and Lachin, the very potential danger of a new war would remain. And this is what is unacceptable. The very first agreement should be more advanced (both in terms of the “ground level,” and in terms of at least minimum elaboration of the conditions of the referendum).

This must not be postponed. Declaration of population’s will on the NK status is a pivotal matter. In the South Caucasus, a sensitive region with so many conflicts, the international community should discourage from solving issues by threats or blood. This is applicable both to the recent past, (i.e., to Armenians on the basis of their military success of 1992-94) and especially to the future, to the Azeris having a nonsensical dream of a military revenge (although both the results of the pre-war referendum and “voting by bullets” are known). A civilized solution is necessary, without a forcible confrontation, and instead of it. NK must not be considered as just someone’s territory and its population’s opinion must not be ignored. Everything should be solved by right and not by force.

In Baku they refer to the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic, which only permits holding referendums on a national scale. But it was adopted in late 1995 just taking into account this conflict. That is, so as not to permit the population of NK (and other regions of the country as well) to express their will. Bringing down of the country’s Basic Law to the status of an instrument of political-propagandistic struggle revenges itself, as it should inevitably be amended from this point of view. And, indeed, any outcome of the NK dispute will require considerable amendments to the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic.

If formal zeal is to be manifested, it is worth more frequently reminding to everybody that its Article 9 refutes war as “means of solving international conflicts.”

One more carelessness, disregard of succession of the Azerbaijani SSR is now hampering Baku to maintain the latter’s “heritage.” The authors of the Constitution of 1995 avoided the Azerbaijani  SSR so much that, when invalidating the Constitution of 1978, they were not able even  to legally correctly name their former republic. In one word, the trick based on the Constitution slides down, does not work. In our times only those to whom this relates directly vote on their status, rather than those whom it concerns indirectly (Quebec and not Canada; Catalonia and not Spain).

About the referendum itself. Why do they postpone it for 10-15 years (i.e. beyond the second term of the Azerbaijani President’s tenure?). Why cannot it be held 4-5 years after they start to implement the desirable agreement? Of course, the Azeris having formerly lived in NKR and children born there are also to vote. They should be provided with the right to return but also the right to learn what authorities they will be ruled by when they are back in NK. They can also vote distantly (as it was at the recent elections to the Milli Mejlis) in order to avoid incidents fraught with tension and referendum failure.

The Co-Chairs should have not left out all these issues (either not disclose or postpone them). The rest of the settlement problems seem not to be so disputable but they also will require great insistency from the parties and the mediators.

The right of voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees to the places of their previous residence is one of the axioms of settlement but it holds for all parties. So is the right of compensation in case of refusal to return. The deep demilitarization of all the liberated regions up to the coming into force of the final status of NK is also necessary. Deployment of the peace-makers will guarantee the security of the returned displaced persons from outside, and the necessary and enough amount of civil police will guarantee it from inside.

I suppose that for the sake of efficiency and at the same time, compactness of the peacekeeping operation, it will be worth to place international monitors along two lines (on the present contact line and on exterior line of withdrawal of the Armenian forces).  And between them, 2-3 sufficiently mobile and powerful storm troops units need to be deployed. Their main goal is to prevent failure of the demilitarization of this zone by any party and to react adequately to the “spontaneous” actions of the civil population (this method isn’t a new one). Before signing the agreements, the parties are to agree about the national structure of the observers and peace-makers.

With their craftiness, the parties hinder the Co-Chairmen to look for settlement, but the latter are sometimes too delicate and “feel shy” to call things by their proper names. Former Co-Chairmen can do it much easier. The parties have created many myths, various propagandistic contrivances around the conflict, sometimes known to be false in advance.

There are those who like to bring forward “the leaves” concealing the “roots” of which they have grown: for example they protrude occupation, but conceal its origin.  Baku gives humanitarian coloring to his demands first to liquidate the occupation and to return its former citizens. It places all the fault for the captures on Armenians, concealing its own sins – the stubborn unwillingness to stop the military actions in 1992-94 even at the expense of the disruptions of mounted agreements on ceasefire (four times!) and frequent rejections to support peace-making initiatives (and the Armenians also “showed adroitness,” but they did not break off and did not avoid such agreements). Here is the result: the loss of 7 regions and displacement of several hundreds of thousands of Azeris. But how all of this occurred – is a taboo theme in Baku, as it casts shadow on A. Elchibei, and even more, on the All-Nation Leader.

Azerbaijan often appeals to four resolutions of the UN Security Council of 1993, demanding their observance, but you cannot find any essential demand in them which is implemented both by the Armenians and by the Azeris themselves (except the ceasefire). And Baku ignored this most important demand of all the resolutions for more than a year then. It tried to gain the upper hand by force (since that time UN Security Council stopped adopting resolutions on Karabakh). Vafa Guluzade, former Adviser to the Presidents of the Azerbajani Republic, said the other day: “The resolutions of the UN Security Council must be fulfilled, and that is all!” But did he repeat this to A. Elchibei and H. Aliyev in 1993-94? Or, maybe they simply ignored his advice?

If the humanitarian considerations were the principal ones, as Baku presents, then it would be possible to liberate a number of regions very long ago and to return home hundreds of thousands of Azeris, elaborate the principles of return of the remaining people, including 45 thousand of the NK inhabitants. It seemed that the huge difference in numbers would wake Baku to display flexibility.

Alas! It comes out that the thing is not only in the sufferings of the migrants. The Co-Chairs have not yet been able to get the acknowledgment by all the parties that the status of the NK remains the main disputable problem. The whole world understands this, but not all the parties accept this. Each considers NK “indisputably” of its own, though this is right only for its inhabitants, both former and current ones. The acknowledgment of the key subject of the dispute will facilitate transition to its civilized solution based on the expression of the will of the population. As everybody care for democracy.

Heydar  Aliyev,  who blamed the National Front of Azerbaijan in loss of NK long ago, understood that it wouldn’t be returned, and he was close  to an exchange for the liberation of the occupied territories. He only sought some compensation (a corridor through Meghri) and a proper mounting. But he started back, finding out that his closer co-workers leave him.

Any kind of agreement with concession (and without them it is impossible) is even more dangerous for the new president. To insure himself from agreements, Ilham Aliyev raises the demands higher: He even would not “cede” NK, though he evades from the normal solution of the dispute on it. Elementary contradictions exist in his speeches: one day he says that “patience is not limitless,” on the other he stands up for not hurrying, in order to gather strength and to force Armenians to capitulation. His statements on peace and war are also contradictory (not even speaking about the incompatibility of war with the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic and about the cost of relapse of violence for both nations). The unwillingness to understand the specific character of the tectonic epoch of the collapse of the USSR and other states in Europe is also evident.

Instead of subject considerations and concrete arguments, too many common phrases about the justice, norms of international law, territorial integrity are in circulation, which are more like incantations. A leader of a nation has hardly a right to consider such a production suitable for the public opinion in the country, but to “sell” it to outsiders is even more difficult.

All this makes impossible the way out to agreements for the time being, dooming the Co-Chairs to a pause with the halved publicity of the real situation in this process, and the forced migrants (“more than a million people!”) – to further vegetation.

With all the respect towards my colleagues Chairmen, I dare to say that now, in the process of elaboration of the “principles,” it is better to impose in every possible way upon the parties the adherence to the peaceful solution of disputes without using force and threats of force. It is not worth to enforce the methods of the solutions, but the above-mentioned principle is not only possible but is also necessary to enforce. Azerbaijan and Armenia took these obligations many times, including in front of the OSCE. And how are they implemented? As in connection with threats, they have been broken for many times.

It is what it would be worth to give not only the rest of 2006, but the coming two years as well, in order to really come closer to the peaceful solution of the Karabakh conflict. From this side it is closer. There is no need to take the issue to the G8 for this, and, for the time being, even to the UN Security Council.