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«Íigh-lights»
(Yerevan), July 24, 2006
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To discourage
solving issues by threats and blood
(or: Reject war as means of solving
international conflicts) By Vladimir Kazimirov From the Editor This article of Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, the former Russian envoy for the Nagorno Karabakh problem, was
disseminated by the Regnum news agency. It presents a comprehensive overview
of the current situation around the NK conflict in the light of the recent
developments, in particular, the partial disclosure of the details of the
proposals by the The report on Karabakh presented by the Minsk Group Co-chairs to the
OSCE Permanent Council and their statements half-opened the content of secret
consultations between the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and The Co-Chairs’ goal evidently was not only
to account at OSCE and exert pressure upon the leaders of the conflict
parties, but also to start “to prepare for peace” their public opinions,
i.e., to do the job which the leaders themselves were expected to. Now
discussion is going on about the advantages and disadvantages of the
settlement course for each side, but, to ensure peace, it is worth to have a
wider look at it. Some media
presented texts of the report and the statements with a great deal of
inaccuracies in translations, which gives rise to false rumors. As far as
more Armenians and Azerbaijanis know Russian better, it is more useful to prepare
originals of documents in this language: for at the present, translations
into English done in I start with, as it
would seem, formal fault-finding in the texts of the Co-Chairmen. They should
not have used in vain the significant terms: principles and agreement. There is no ground for speaking about
“basic principles” here, and there is even less ground to speak about a “frame
agreement.” Only general outlines of
the settlement have been prepared. No principles, especially new ones, are
seen. True, the Co-Chairs
try to introduce two real
principles in Karabakh extremely important in
conflict situations: non-application
of force and threats of force; peaceful settlement of disputes. And they should be
provided a world support in it! It is also too
early to speak about an agreement, even a frame one. Even if the “principles”
were adopted, this would give the two parties
only a political consent, but would
not guarantee coming to an agreement yet. Each element would require
long-winded negotiations in order to ripen for inclusion in full-value, legally binding agreements. There are also
problems with the number of the parties to an agreement. It does not fit to
the Co-Chairs to suppose that “perhaps Therefore, the
carelessness in the The Co-Chairs announce themselves successors
of achievements of only the last 9 years. What a strange calculation! The But let’s pass to
the most important, to the essence
of the problem. One should not start the settlement process peacefully
(withdrawal from seized territories) and afterwards take no care what
happens. The Co-Chairs speak
about the stability of the peace process and guarantees
only casually, at end of the list of the proposed measures. Absolute renunciation of force by all
conflict sides, refusal of any attempts to resume violence should become
the primary “unconditional condition“ (sine qua non). It will require
stipulation in the international level as well, perhaps, at the UN Security
Council. This must in no case be left just outlined and unfinished. This is
like finishing “the ground level”
of a building construction before starting other levels. Threats to the peaceful process mainly come from The Co-Chair’s
current scheme is “majority of
territories in exchange for the promise of a referendum on the status of Nagorno Karabakh” (it is
not clear what a referendum and when). It envisages Armenians’ leaving 5 regions, and almost everything essential of the remaining
hangs in an uncertainty. It is naïve to expect that the sides will reach
an agreement on the referendum later. Hence, no referendum will be held at
all. At least the unsolved problem of the Nagorno Karabakh status - the main problem of the conflict, the
problems of Kelbajar and Lachin,
the very potential danger of a new war would remain. And this is what is
unacceptable. The very first agreement should be more advanced (both in terms
of the “ground level,” and in terms of at least minimum elaboration of the
conditions of the referendum). This must not be
postponed. Declaration of population’s
will on the NK status is a pivotal matter. In the In If formal zeal is
to be manifested, it is worth more frequently reminding to everybody that its
Article 9 refutes war as “means of
solving international conflicts.” One more
carelessness, disregard
of succession of the Azerbaijani SSR is now hampering About the
referendum itself. Why do they postpone it for 10-15 years (i.e. beyond the
second term of the Azerbaijani President’s tenure?). Why cannot it be held 4-5 years after they start to
implement the desirable agreement? Of course, the Azeris
having formerly lived in NKR and children born there are also to vote. They
should be provided with the right to return but also the right to learn what authorities they will be ruled by when they are
back in NK. They can also vote distantly (as it was at the recent elections
to the Milli Mejlis) in
order to avoid incidents fraught with tension and referendum failure. The Co-Chairs
should have not left out all these issues (either not disclose or postpone
them). The rest of the settlement problems seem not to be so disputable but
they also will require great insistency from the parties and the mediators. The right of
voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees to the places of their
previous residence is one of the axioms of settlement but it holds for all parties. So is the right of
compensation in case of refusal to return. The deep demilitarization of all the liberated regions up to the
coming into force of the final status of NK is also necessary. Deployment of
the peace-makers will guarantee the security of the returned displaced
persons from outside, and the necessary and enough amount of civil police
will guarantee it from inside. I suppose that for
the sake of efficiency and at the same time, compactness of the peacekeeping operation, it will be
worth to place international monitors along two lines (on the present contact
line and on exterior line of withdrawal of the Armenian forces). And between them, 2-3 sufficiently mobile
and powerful storm troops units need to be deployed. Their main goal is to
prevent failure of the demilitarization of this zone by any party and to
react adequately to the “spontaneous” actions of the civil population (this
method isn’t a new one). Before signing the agreements, the parties are to
agree about the national structure of the observers and peace-makers. With their craftiness, the parties hinder the
Co-Chairmen to look for settlement, but the latter are sometimes too delicate
and “feel shy” to call things by their proper names. Former Co-Chairmen can
do it much easier. The parties have created many myths, various propagandistic
contrivances around the conflict, sometimes known to be false in advance. There are those who
like to bring forward “the leaves” concealing the “roots” of which they have
grown: for example they protrude occupation,
but conceal its origin. Azerbaijan often appeals to four resolutions of the UN Security
Council of 1993,
demanding their observance, but you cannot find any essential demand in them
which is implemented both by the Armenians and by the Azeris
themselves (except the ceasefire). And If the humanitarian considerations were the
principal ones, as Alas! It comes out
that the thing is not only in the sufferings of the migrants. The Co-Chairs
have not yet been able to get the acknowledgment by all the parties that the status of the NK remains the main disputable problem. The whole
world understands this, but not all the parties accept this. Each considers
NK “indisputably” of its own, though this is right only for its inhabitants,
both former and current ones. The acknowledgment of the key subject of the
dispute will facilitate transition to
its civilized solution based on the expression of the will of the
population. As everybody care for democracy. Heydar Aliyev, who blamed the National Front of Azerbaijan
in loss of NK long ago, understood that it wouldn’t be returned, and he was
close to an exchange for the
liberation of the occupied territories. He only sought some compensation (a
corridor through Meghri) and a proper mounting. But
he started back, finding out that his closer co-workers leave him. Any kind of
agreement with concession (and without them it is impossible) is even more
dangerous for the new president. To
insure himself from agreements, Ilham Aliyev raises the demands
higher: He even would not “cede” NK, though he evades from the normal
solution of the dispute on it. Elementary
contradictions exist in his speeches: one day he says
that “patience is not limitless,” on the other he stands up for not hurrying,
in order to gather strength and to force Armenians to capitulation. His
statements on peace and war are also contradictory (not even speaking about
the incompatibility of war with the Constitution of the Instead of subject
considerations and concrete arguments, too many common phrases about the
justice, norms of international law, territorial integrity are in
circulation, which are more like incantations. A leader of a nation has
hardly a right to consider such a production suitable for the public opinion
in the country, but to “sell” it to outsiders is even more difficult. All this makes impossible the way out to
agreements for the time being, dooming the Co-Chairs to a pause with the
halved publicity of the real situation in this process, and the forced
migrants (“more than a million people!”) – to
further vegetation. With all the
respect towards my colleagues Chairmen, I dare to say that now, in the
process of elaboration of the “principles,” it is better to impose in every possible way upon the
parties the adherence to the peaceful solution
of disputes without using force and threats of force. It is not worth to
enforce the methods of the solutions, but the above-mentioned principle is
not only possible but is also necessary to enforce. It is what it would
be worth to give not only the rest of
2006, but the coming two years as well, in order to really come closer to
the peaceful solution of the Karabakh conflict. From
this side it is closer. There is no need to take the issue to the G8 for
this, and, for the time being, even to the UN Security Council. |
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