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Performance at the international conference about (Yerevan,
November, 7th, 2006) |
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Principles Guiding Relations between States in Political Settlement of Conflicts in the
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I wish we could
imagine the South Caucasus without the three protracted conflicts which
complicate the situation in the region, turning it into a seat of
international tension, hindering both the young state’s development and their
cooperation with each other, as well as with other countries, and impeding
the integration processes so much needed in today’s world. These conflicts
should be overcome but their peaceful political settlement still eludes us. In
depending their interests, the parties to the conflict often refer –
sometimes reasonably, sometimes not – to the principles guiding relations
between states enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. More often then not they
refer to the principle of territorial integrity of states and the people’s
right to determine their own destiny. And in so doing, they willfully and self-interestedly
devise a sort of hierarchy whereby: one of the two principles is proclaimed
to be predominating, as if overpowering the others. If any of the ten
principles could be made absolute, it should be refraining from the threat or
use of force and that of peaceful settlement of disputes. This concerns, to
some extent, all the three conflicts in the region but I shall basically
refer to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict as I am better acquainted with. It’s
important to clarify the role played by principles in political settlement of
disputes, what they can really do and what they cannot. Of course, one
should not abandon the alternative – that of pragmatic solutions and
exchanges between the parties to the conflict on certain issues – ways
totally “unprincipled”, as they could seem, they considerably facilitate the
next agreements, create useful dynamics in the settlement process contrary to
the long-term resistance and deadlock caused by opposing the territorial
integrity to the right to self-determination. In my view, one of the mistakes
of the OSCE Summit held in Here are some ideas
I would like to share with you. 1. The term
principle demands clarification. It is not an absolute, it is not a dogma, it is a cluster of general concepts, an abstraction, which
does not exist beyond concrete circumstances, as if threaded on a rod. All the more so
since, there is not one principle but a dozen of them. All of them are equal,
and are taken together and not at choice – at your will it. Those who call
for the territorial integrity and the right to self-determination do not want
to take into account what the Helsinki Act says, that all the principles are
of primary importance, thus should be applied equally and strictly while
interpreting each of them with due regard for the other ones. Does this link between
the principles and their time mean that if the time changes, the principles
will die out, that they are “passing” and have no
future? No! The conceptual nucleus of each principle is its considerable
contribution to the international relations, and even to world civilization. However on every
occasion each principle is ‘screwed not into’ some abstract future but is
used in some concrete historical, geographical and other circumstances that
need to be taken into account. The time and specific environment are of great
importance for the application of each principle and for their effectiveness.
Metaphorically speaking, it is not the principles ‘command’ the time, but the
time influences the principles, adjusting their effectiveness. In other
words, everything is much more complicated and no simplification is
admissible. For those who
disagree, I shall cite an example. If the principle of the territorial
integrity of states is absolute, why did it not work in the case of the There are two
omnipresent dimensions, these of space and time. The permanent questions are
where and when. All international processes and events are relief – they are
not flat, developing beyond time and space, history and geography. 3. Applicability
and effectiveness of this or that principle is relative. It is not enough to
declare a principle correct by itself. Its applicability and effectiveness
should be justified in that particular case. And when there is a lack of
arguments, principles are refered to in a general way, as if this done would
bring about results. Let us take an
example. So is the right to territorial
integrity, still he insists on making it absolute. The Azerbaijani
politicians reiterate the slogan of territorial integrity as if this was a
magic refrain. Here an oriental proverb comes to mind: saying 'halva-halva'
won't make your mouth sweet. I would also like
to point out the difference between Nagorno Karabakh and (Incidentally I
must condemn both the Stalin resettlement of peoples, and Soviet Armenia’s petitions
in front of 4. What is to be done
when in relation to the Nagorno Karabakh issue, some appeal to the
territorial integrity, others – to the self-determination right? Should the specifics
of the case be taken into account? Or is it of no importance – suffice it to name
the preferred principle and the opposing arguments shall be ignored? Appealing to
territorial integrity is the favorite argument of the Azerbaijani and
Georgian diplomats, while ignoring the other principles guiding relations
between states. Their interest in it can be understood, but they have to
prove that this principle is applicable and effective for the given case. All
the circumstances relevant to the case should be taken into account. 5. Considering the
specific nature of the 90s is of great importance. This time differs drastically
from that of The shifts in the
90s shook the world, and the In this time and in
this region, people’s right to self-determination in most cases prevails over
that of territorial integrity. Could the principle of territorial integrity,
in this tectonic, force- majeur age and particularly in an area where states were
collapsing, work as reliably as before? Of course, not. And which of the two
principles led to the sovereignty of the 21 union republics ( Who could decide
that dissolution must stop at the level of the union republics? You cannot afford
to make them smaller, they said. Kosovo, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh are both
actors and products of dissolution of states in that time of objective
circumstances, demographic shifts, and wars. It is important to understand
and explain the logic of the shifts that took place. Not to continue the disintegration
but to take objective realities into account. Raising the issue of waiting
for the precedents to occur, in my view, is not quite precise. Kosovo may serve
as another argument but only a supplementary one, and not the initial one. It
will aggravate the controversy as to what is superior: the right of self-determination
or that of territorial integrity? Anyway, the point of departure is the nature
of the time and the region as well as prevailing circumstances. It is important to specify,
about whose territorial integrity, what state there is a speech? In the case
of Nagorno Karabakh, it turns out that it concerns Azerbaijan SSR. But in Abolishing the 1978
Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR, the authors of the present day
Constitution of the In Azerbaijan SSR,
Soviet laws were in force including the law of the procedure of ceding from
the The destine of Nagorno
Karabakh should be settled through negotiations, and if they fail, through
the expression of the will of the population, and not through forcible
attempts of a restrictive use of unfounded, unmotivated references to this or
that Helsinki principle, without full account of all the essential
circumstances.
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